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Abstract According to John Searle’s well-known Is-Ought Argument, it is possible to
derive an ought-statement from is-statements only. This argument concerns obligations
involved in institutions such as promising, and it relies on the idea that institutions can be
conceptualized in terms of constitutive rules. In this paper, I argue that the structure of this
argument has never been fully appreciated. Starting from my status account of constitutive
rules, I reconstruct the argument and establish that it is valid. This reconstruction reveals that
the soundness of the argument depends on whether collective acceptance as such can
generate obligations. Margaret Gilbert has argued that it can, and thus far some of her
central arguments have not been addressed. The upshot is that the Is-Ought Argument
deserves to be taken seriously once again.
Keywords Collective acceptance . Constitutive rule . Institution . Is-Ought
thesis . Promise . Searle
Successfully making a promise entails an obligation to do as promised. So much is clear.
However, it remains controversial what exactly the source of this obligation is. Many believe
it originates from moral principles. John Searle (1964, 1969) has defended the idea that it
originates instead from the institution of promising. Furthermore, he has argued that a
statement about an obligation to do as promised can be derived from descriptive statements
concerning the performance of the institutional act of promising. Searle’s argument
concerning promising, to which I shall refer as ‘the Is-Ought Argument’, flies in the face
of the widely held belief that it is impossible to derive an ought-statement from is-statements
only. In this paper, I revisit the Is-Ought Argument. In his presentation of it, Searle uses the
notion of a constitutive rule. He has, however, never provided a detailed analysis of this
notion. In section 1, I present the status account of constitutive rules that I have developed
elsewhere (Hindriks 2009, 2012), and argue that it can be used to clarify the structure of the
argument. The reconstruction that I present in sections 2 and 3 reveals that the argument is
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valid. It also facilitates the identification of the pivotal premise of the argument: collective
acceptance can generate obligations without the support of moral principles.
Searle (1995, 2010) employs the notion of collective acceptance in his more recent work
on social ontology. In section 4 I argue that his account of this notion does not adequately
support the claim that collective acceptance of obligations generates obligations. Margaret
Gilbert’s account of collective acceptance is much more promising in this respect. To make
clear how difficult it is to defend the pivotal premise, I devote section 5.1 to Michael
Bratman’s (1999, 2009) argument that promissory obligations follow from shared intentions
only in combination with the value of assurance (cf. Scanlon 1990). Subsequently, I turn to
Gilbert’s (2006) arguments as to why obligations such as promissory obligations are social
rather than moral obligations and do not depend on moral principles (section 5.2). Gilbert’s
arguments support the pivotal premise of the Is-Ought Argument. Thus far, those who
criticize this premise have not properly addressed these arguments. In light of this, I
conclude that, because of recent advances in theorizing about constitutive rules and collec-
tive acceptance, the Is-Ought Argument deserves to be taken seriously once again.
1 The Status Account of Constitutive Rules
1.1 Searle on Constitutive Rules
The notion of a constitutive rule plays a crucial role in Searle’s (1964, 1969) Is-Ought
Argument.1 As indicated above, Searle has never provided a detailed analysis of this notion.
This is unfortunate, because, as I shall argue below, a thorough analysis of this notion can be
used to clarify the structure of the argument. Nevertheless, what Searle says about consti-
tutive rules provides for a useful point of departure for developing a more detailed account.
Searle characterizes the notion of a constitutive rule by contrasting it with that of a regulative
rule. His contention is that, whereas regulative rules merely regulate behavior that is possible
independently of such rules, constitutive rules create the possibility of new forms of
behavior. A well-known example he uses is the game of chess. Playing a game of chess,
or, to use a more specific example, checkmating one’s opponent, is not possible indepen-
dently of the rules of the game. Hence, those rules are constitutive rules. According to
Searle, the structure of constitutive rules is ‘X counts as Y in C’. The chess example naturally
fits this format: ‘Moving a chess piece in a position such that the opponent’s king is under
attack and cannot make a move to undo this counts as checkmating one’s opponent in a
game of chess’.
Searle (1969) left several questions unanswered. The one most relevant to our purposes
here is: How do constitutive rules create the possibility of new forms of behavior? Searle’s
later work provides at least a partial answer to this question. In his 1995, Searle introduced
the notion of collective acceptance. It seems that what he has in mind is that something is
collectively accepted exactly if the members of the relevant collective (collectively) believe
it (Searle 1995, 32). Furthermore, he appears to hold that new or institutional behavior is
possible once it is collectively accepted that certain non-institutional behavior is or con-
stitutes institutional behavior as a rule. The core idea is that we collectively impose
institutional features on certain kinds of behavior that thus acquires a new character.
Two other novel elements in Searle’s recent account of constitutive rules are the notion of
a status function and that of deontic power (ibid., 40–43 and 100–01; see also his 2010).
1 See some of the papers in Hudson (1969) for early criticisms of the Is-Ought Argument.
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Deontic powers are institutional rights and obligations, such as the right of transfer involved
in the institution of property. People owe their deontic powers to collective acceptance of the
relevant constitutive rules. Status functions differ from the functions of artifacts such as
screwdrivers and hammers. Whereas the latter can perform their functions in virtue of their
physical features, this does not hold for entities that have status functions. An entity can
perform a status function only because it is collectively accepted to have that function. The
collectively accepted status function of money, for instance, is to serve as a means of
exchange. Just as status functions, deontic powers depend on collective acceptance.
1.2 Status Rules
In order to use Searle’s new ideas about social ontology to reconstruct his earlier Is-Ought
argument, a couple of amendments need to be made. The first of these concerns the notion of
a function. In spite of appearances, this notion does not really do any work in Searle’s
conception of a status function. Searle seems to be aware of the problem when he writes that
‘not all status functions would ordinarily be thought of as functions’ (2010, 95n2). He goes
on to claim that such functions are ‘sufficiently like ordinary functions’ to warrant the label
(ibid.). Without further evidence, this claim is not very convincing. And an alternative is
readily available: institutional statuses can be characterized in terms of deontic powers
without recourse to the notion of a function. Note, for instance, that the physical features
that an object has are of little relevance both to its status function and to the deontic powers
that are associated with it. Searle does not provide a positive characterization of status
functions. So his theory does not provide any reasons for thinking that the notion is
essential.2
One might think that some of Searle’s examples reveal that the notion of a function adds
something to that of a status. On the face of it, this is particularly plausible for money.
Money is indeed often characterized in terms of functions, in particular that of means of
exchange. In spite of this, it can be analyzed exhaustively in terms of deontic powers, or so I
argue. One might think that there is nothing normative about an object serving as a means of
exchange. However, the institution of money presupposes that of property. The result of a
monetary exchange is that the distribution of property rights is altered. Someone who buys a
product in a store ends up being the owner of that product. Someone who has money, then,
has the ability to change the distribution of property rights. This means that he has a power-
right (section 2.1.3 of Wenar 2005). Hence, a means of exchange is a deontic power after all:
purchasing power.
Searle’s conception of rights and obligations is unduly restrictive. When he writes about
deontic powers, he appears to have in mind privileges and claims (Searle 1995, 106–07). A
privilege consists of a permission to perform a particular action (or the absence of a duty not
to do so); a claim consists of a duty someone else has with respect to the person who has the
claim to perform a particular action (Wenar 2005). In addition to these two, the well-known
Hohfeldian classification of rights includes power-rights and immunities. A power-right
consists of the ability to change the existing distribution of rights. And someone has an
immunity if someone else is unable to change the rights she has. There is no good reason for
believing that institutions do not involve powers other than privileges and claims. In order to
2 Searle used to hold that status functions and deontic powers could come apart. He maintained that purely
honorific status functions do not come with any deontic powers (Searle 1995). He abandons this claim in his
more recent work, and now holds that all status functions come with institutional rights or obligations (Searle
2010).
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mark my more encompassing approach to the normative dimension of institutions, I shall
use the term ‘normative power’ rather than ‘deontic power’. On my proposal, then, a status
consists of one or more normative powers.
These amendments will prove to be useful below. They reveal that once the normative
powers of a status have been explicated, there is nothing left to be accounted for. This means
that there are no hidden premises concerning the relevant status and its function that might
invalidate the derivation of an ought-statement from is-statements only. The broader con-
ception of powers on which I rely will turn out to be useful in relation to the example of
money. Promising is a rather complex example, because there are so many different
perspectives on what it is and in particular on why it entails an obligation. I will argue that
a derivation can be constructed for the case of money that is similar to the one concerning
promising. Rival views concerning the relevant normative powers are less distracting in the
case of money. However, in order to make that point it needs to be clear that the status of
money can indeed be explicated in terms of powers. As money cannot be explicated in terms
of ordinary rights and obligations, or privileges and claims, I needed to introduce the notion
of a normative power in order to show that the same conceptual apparatus used for
promising can also be used for explicating the status of money.
Insofar as the term ‘status function’ is concerned, Searle’s social ontology is too baroque.
In another respect, however, it is too simple. As I have argued elsewhere, Searle’s social
ontology is incomplete: the notion of a constitutive rule needs to be complemented with that
of a status rule (Hindriks 2009; 2012). As I conceive of them, status rules concern the
enabling and constraining roles of institutions, their practical significance. More specifically,
a status rule specifies the normative powers that are characteristic of a particular status. The
structure of a status rule is ‘Y is Z’. An example is: money is a means of exchange, which is
equivalent to: money is purchasing power. This entails that money can be used for buying
and selling. As the example suggests, a status rule provides a (sometimes partial) definition
of the term that designates the status it is concerned with. It is a matter of definition that
money is purchasing power.3 In sections 2 and 3 the notion of a status rule will prove to be
important for clarifying the structure of Searle’s Is-Ought Argument.
Status rules are, of course, intimately related to constitutive rules. On the status account of
constitutive rules that I defend here, a constitutive rule specifies what it takes for an entity to
have a particular status in a certain context. What that status consists of is specified or
defined by the relevant status rule. Constitutive rules make new forms of behavior possible
in the sense that, when a constitutive rule is collectively accepted, non-institutional forms of
behavior acquire an institutional status. More generally, collective acceptance of a constitu-
tive rule entails that entities present in context C that satisfy conditions X have status Y. What
was said about collective acceptance above puts me in the position to reformulate the
structure of constitutive rules. Doing so will be helpful for clarifying the structure of Searle’s
Is-Ought argument.
Recall that, according to Searle, the structure of a constitutive rule is ‘X counts as Y in C’.
On the status account, something has a status Y due to the fact that entities of that kind are
collectively accepted to have that status. Collective acceptance involves believing that the
entities have that status as well as being disposed to treat them as such Once the role of
3 Searle (1969, 31) holds that constitutive rules define new forms of behavior. It is hard to see, however, how
this could be. The constitutive rule of money in a particular context, for instance, concerns the pieces of paper
or metal of which money is made in that context. The stuff that money is made off, however, is irrelevant to
the definition of money. It is more felicitous, I believe, to accept the idea that status rules provide definitions of
the statuses they concern.
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collective acceptance of the rule is explicitly acknowledged, there is no need anymore to use
the phrase ‘counts as’ when stating the structure of constitutive rules (see section 2.2 for
more on this). On my view, then, the structure of constitutive rules is ‘In C, X is Y’. A
(simplified) example that will play an important role in section 2 is this: In the United Status,
any piece of paper that has been issued by the Federal Reserve is money. Thus, a constitutive
rule enumerates the conditions (X) that an entity has to meet in the context at issue (C) in
order for it to have the relevant status (Y).4 The X-term, then, describes what constitutes the
relevant status in a particular context C.
The status account of constitutive rules can be represented in terms of what I call ‘the
status schema’. The status schema consists of the schemas for constitutive rules and status
rules:
(C) In C, X is Y
(S) Y is Z
In the case of US money, the status schema is to be filled in as follows: In the context of
the United States (C1), any piece of paper that has been issued by the Federal Reserve (X1) is
money (Y1); money (Y1) is purchasing power (Z1). The status schema reveals that in effect a
constitutive rule ascribes a set of normative powers (Z) to a particular kind of entity (X) in a
particular context (C).
2 Money and the Logic of Institutional Action
2.1 The Normative Power Derivation
Having introduced the status account of constitutive rules, it is now time to consider Searle’s
Is-Ought Argument. The argument consists of a counterexample to the claim that no ought-
statement can be derived from is-statements only. This claim is known as ‘the Is-Ought
Thesis’. Inspired by Anscombe (1958), Searle argued that statements concerning the insti-
tution of promising provide for a counterexample to the thesis. Searle claimed that the
argument generalizes. This means that institutions other than promising can be used to
elucidate the argument. In this section I shall use money as my guiding example of how a
normative statement can be derived from merely factual statements. I discuss promising in
section 3. This allows me to consider “the logic of institutional action” without being
distracted by the intricacies of the case of promising.
The status schema introduced in section 1 can be used for uncovering the structure of
Searle’s argument. At this point I shall not yet be concerned with the question whether all
premises are purely factual propositions. Rather than arguing that an ought-statement can be
derived from mere is-statements, I shall first argue that the status schema can be used to
derive normative conclusions. Suppose you are in the United States, and you have a piece of
paper in your pocket that has been issued by the Federal Reserve. Given the way the
institution of money works in the United States – i.e. given the constitutive rule of money
that is operative in that context – you can infer from this that you have money in your
pocket. The status rule of money basically says that anything that is money can be used as a
means of exchange. In light of this, it puts you in the position to infer that you have a certain
amount of purchasing power.
4 More precisely, I suggest that in C an entity that is X constitutes an entity that is Y. See Hindriks (2012) for
more on the metaphysics of constitution in relation to constitutive rules.
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At the heart of this argument lies the status schema. Its first two premises are a status rule
(S) and a constitutive rule (C). The third and fourth premises concern first, the fact that a
particular object is in a context C, and second, that the object is X. The intermediate
conclusion that is then drawn is that objects that are X have status Y. This follows premises
two and three, i.e. from (C) and the fact that the relevant context obtains. This intermediate
conclusion is the fifth statement of the argument. In combination with premise four – the fact
that a particular object in the context at issue is X – it implies that the object has status Y.5
Given the status rule in premise 1, this in turn entails that the object has normative power Z. I
call this argument ‘the Normative Power Derivation’. It encapsulates the logic of institu-
tional action. The Normative Power Derivation is clearly valid.
In section 1 I argued that purchasing power is a power-right, a normative power that
involves the ability to affect property rights. Suppose that, in spite of this, you are not
convinced that the conclusion that you have a certain amount of purchasing power is a
normative conclusion. In order to bring this point home, it will help to consider legal tender.
This case clearly allows us to infer the existence of an obligation. The status rule of legal
tender is this: anything that is legal tender in the context at issue has to be accepted by a
creditor in fulfillment of a debt. In other words, a creditor is obliged to accept money that is
legal tender in the context at issue if someone wants to use it to settle a debt. Now one-dollar
bills are ‘legal tender for all debts, public and private’, as it says on one-dollar bills right next
to the image of George Washington. So, from the fact that you possess a one-dollar bill you
can infer that someone to whom you have to repay a debt is obliged to accept it in fulfillment
of a debt.6
The Normative Power Derivation reveals that normative conclusions can be derived from
the status schema. This by itself does not prove that the schema can be used for generating
counterexamples to the Is-Ought Thesis. That stronger claim turns on the question whether
the status schema can be used to derive an ought-statement from is-statements only. The
stronger conclusion only follows, then, if all the premises in the argument are mere factual
statements. I address this issue in section 2.3. First, however, I need to return to the role that
collective acceptance plays in relation to constitutive rules. This serves to make a couple of
hidden premises explicit one of which will turn out to be the pivotal premise of the Is-Ought
Argument.
2.2 The Collective Acceptance Principle
Are constitutive rules mere factual statements? Recall that the phrase ‘counts as’ figures in
the structure of constitutive rules as Searle conceives of them. At the end of section 1, I
provided a formulation of the structure of constitutive rules in which that phrase does not
feature. The reason for this is that its meaning can be explicated in terms of collective
acceptance. What it means to say that a certain object counts as another object that has a
certain institutional status is that the object has that status due to the fact that it is collectively
accepted that such objects have that status. More generally, what it means to say that objects
of a certain type X count as objects that are Y is that such objects have such a status due to the
fact that this is collectively accepted. In more technical terms, the phrase ‘counts as’ is to be
explicated in terms of what I call the Collective Acceptance Principle [CAP]:
(In G, p) ↔ CAG (p) [CAP]
5 More precisely, the status is a property of the object that is constituted by the object that is X (see note 4).
6 In the US all currency is legal tender. This need not be the case, however. In Scotland, for instance, only one
and two-pound coins are legal tender for unlimited amounts.
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with G for the group who collectively accepts a proposition p, and CA as the collective
acceptance operator.7 Of course, [CAP] cannot be applied to just any proposition (at least not
without substantial qualification; a group’s collectively accepting that reindeer can fly does not
make it so). However, the principle applies to all constitutive rules. This entails that a
constitutive rule is in force if and only if it is collectively accepted to be in force.
Collective acceptance of the relevant constitutive rule was in effect taken for granted in
the formulation of the Normative Power Derivation in section 2.1. As will become clear
soon, making its role explicit is essential for appreciating the significance of the argument.
What needs to be added to the argument is a premise in which the relevant constitutive rule
features in the collective acceptance principle [CAP], as well as a statement according to
which that constitutive rule is in fact collectively accepted. Given these two premises, it is
possible to conclude that the constitutive rule is in force. So rather than as a premise, the
constitutive rule now features as an intermediate conclusion in the argument that is based on
two new premises. As this intermediate conclusion does indeed follow from the two
premises, this expanded Normative Power Derivation is also valid.
The argument structure can be run for any institutional status. Let me run through it in
more detail for the case of money. We have already seen that ‘money is a means of
exchange’ is the status rule for money ((S), premise 1). We have also seen that in the case
of US American one-dollar bills the (somewhat simplified) constitutive rule is this: any piece
of paper that has been issued by the Federal Reserve is money. All such entities are indeed
money, according to the status account, just in case it is collectively accepted to be the case
([CAP], premise 2). This constitutive rule is indeed collectively accepted (premise 3). The
context at issue obtains, and the piece of paper is indeed located somewhere in the United
States (C, premise 4). The piece of paper has the relevant features: the Federal Reserve has
indeed issued it (X, premise 5). The constitutive rule for dollar bills – statement (6) – follows
from premises 2 and 3, i.e. from the [CAP] as applied to the constitutive rule of US money in
combination with collective acceptance of that rule. Given that the relevant context C
obtains (4), statement (6) allows us to infer that anything that has the relevant features is
money (7). So we can conclude that the piece of paper is money (8, from 5 and 7). This in
turn entails that it has purchasing power (9, from 1 and 8).
2.3 The Premises Are Factual Statements
In order for the Normative Power Derivation to generate one or more counterexamples to the
Is-Ought Thesis, all of its premises have to be (mere) factual statements. So we need a
conception of what it takes for a statement, sentence or premise to be non-normative. Two
necessary conditions for a sentence to be normative are generally accepted. A sentence is
normative only if first, it is synthetic and second, it uses a normative term. Analytic premises
are non-normative by definition.8 Although the Is-Ought Thesis is usually formulated at the
7 The CAP is a simplification of the Collective Acceptance Thesis defended by Tuomela and Balzer (1999)
and Tuomela (2002, 132 and note 6). It represents the basic “axiom” that governs the collective acceptance
operator. The left-to-right implication captures the so-called reflexivity of institutional notions, and the right-
to-left implication gives what is known as their performativity.
8 Brink (1989, 147) writes: ‘Proponents of the is/ought thesis claim or assume that a statement is a moral
statement just in case it is a synthetic statement expressed by a sentence in which at least one term is used (and
not merely mentioned) in its moral sense. Only synthetic statements count as moral, on their view, because
analytic statements are held to be linguistic or semantic and hence, not moral statements.’ If ‘moral’ is
replaced by ‘normative’, this passage supports the claim made in the main text (recall that Searle is concerned
with an institutional rather than a moral obligation; 1969, 176).
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semantic level, where the issue is analyticity, this is not essential to it. A priori necessity is
the analogue of analyticity at the conceptual level. So, when considering how to derive an
ought from an is in relation to propositions, the relevant question is whether they are
necessarily and a priori true. I approach the issue from an epistemic perspective here.
Tuomela (2002, 132) points out, that the Collective Acceptance Principle is a necessary
truth. It is also a conceptual truth that institutional entities such as money exist if and only if
they are accepted to exist. Hence, the CAP holds necessarily and a priori.
Status rules are definitions. As noted in section 2.1, they can be regarded as explications
of the meaning of the relevant status term. I take this to be obvious in the cases of money and
legal tender. Surely, money is a means of exchange by definition, and what it means for an
object to be legal tender is that a creditor is obliged to accept it in fulfillment of a debt. As
they are definitions, status rules express a priori necessary truths.
None of the synthetic or a posteriori premises are normative. Whether the relevant consti-
tutive rule is collectively accepted is a factual matter (more on this in sections 3 and 4). The
same holds for the fact that the relevant context obtains. Presumably none of the X-conditions
that are met are normative.9 It follows that a normative statement is derived from non-normative
statements, or that an ought-statement is derived from is-statements only. The Is-Ought
Argument has it that this is possible. If the premises are true and have the character they have
been argued to have, the Is-Ought Thesis according to which this is impossible is false.
There can be little doubt that the synthetic or a posteriori premises are indeed not
normative. Furthermore, status rules are clearly definitions, at least in the cases considered
so far. So the question arises whether there is any reason to question the Collective
Acceptance Principle as applied to constitutive rules and institutional statuses. Premise (2)
embodies in effect what turns out to be the pivotal claim that collective acceptance of a
normative power can generate that power all by itself. In other words, the argument turns on
the idea that institutional obligations exist exactly if the institutional statuses with which they
are associated are collectively accepted to exist. I shall return to this idea in section 4. A
question that needs to be addressed first is whether the Normative Power Derivation
represents the underlying structure of Searle’s Is-Ought Argument concerning promising.
We shall see that it does, but that it involves a second controversial claim: the claim that
promises involve obligations by definition.
3 Promising
The example Searle used in his Is-Ought Argument is promising. Searle’s argument
concerning promising can be reconstructed in a way analogous to the argument concerning
money presented in the previous section. In other words, it is an instance of the Normative
Power Derivation (NPD) and it relies on the status schema and the Collective Acceptance
Principle [CAP]. Searle focused on promises made by uttering sentences the first words of
9 Many of the X-conditions are obviously factual (e.g. money is made of a particular kind of paper). Some of
the X-conditions may be institutional, however. Few if any institutions can exist independently of other
institutions. Money, for instance, presupposes an institution of property. Such other institutions can occur as
part of the X-conditions or of the context. I do not believe that these aspects raise new issues for the derivation.
The other institutions that are relevant depend on collective acceptance, too, and collective acceptance is
already at the center of our attention. If evaluative or normative issues arise with respect to other institutions, it
should be possible to bring them out explicitly also with respect to the institution under analysis. See section 5
for a discussion of a way in which normativity could play a different role from the way it figures in the
analysis thus far.
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which are ‘I hereby promise’. I shall call such sentences P-sentences. Searle’s views on
promising can be related to the status account of constitutive rules by relying on the status
schema.10 In light of this, both a status and a constitutive rule need to be formulated. The
status rule of promising is:
[1] Anybody who makes a promise is obliged to do as promised.
Searle takes this to be true by definition.11 The constitutive rule is:
[6] In context C, anybody who utters a P-sentence thereby makes a promise.
In section 2.2, I have argued that a constitutive rule is in force only if it is collectively
accepted to be in force. Hence, [3] states that it is collectively accepted that in context C
anybody who utters a P-sentence thereby makes a promise. Against the background of this
premise features [2]: the constitutive rule applies exactly if it is collectively accepted to be
operative. The other two premises needed for deriving a normative conclusion are that the
relevant context C obtains [4] and that a specific person, let us call him ‘Jones’ as in Searle’s
own example, uttered a P-sentence [5].
The derivation works exactly as in the case of money. So the fact that the constitutive rule
of promising is in force [6] follows from collective acceptance of that rule [3] in combination
with the fact that this rule is in force exactly if it is collectively accepted to be in force [2].
The fact that the relevant context C obtains [4] and that in context C uttering a P-sentence is
a matter of making a promise [6] together imply that uttering a P-sentence is a matter of
making a promise [7]. At this point, the constitutive rule is operative and the relevant context
obtains, which means that any utterance act that satisfies the X-conditions, i.e. any utterance
of a P-sentence, is a matter of making a promise. Given that he has uttered a P-sentence [5],
it follows from [7] that Jones has made a promise [8]. Against the background of the status
rule of promising [1], this [8] in turn implies that Jones is obliged to do as promised [9].
Statement [9] is a normative conclusion. Suppose that the premises are true. If they have the
character they have been said to have, none of the premises is normative. Given these
presuppositions, this example concerning Jones making a promise is another counterexam-
ple to the claim that no ought-statement can be derived from is-statements.
As in the cases of money and legal tender, the crucial premise turns out to be premise [2],
i.e. the Collective Acceptance Principle applied to the constitutive rule of promising. Recall
that [CAP] comes down to the claim that collective acceptance suffices to generate obliga-
tions.12 An underlying assumption is that no normative attitude such as endorsement is
needed. Looking back, it seems that Searle was aware of this (1969, 189–90 and 194–95).
10 I am concerned here with Searle’s views on promising as he expressed them in the sixties when he defended
his Is-Ought Argument. See note 13 for Searle’s more recent views.
11 Searle claims that ‘to make a promise is to undertake an obligation’ (1964, 56). He also writes about
‘definitional connections’ between ‘promise’, ‘obligate’, and ‘ought’ and he calls the claim that ‘one ought to
keep one’s promises’ a tautology (ibid., 49, 56). Finally, he claims that ‘promising is, by definition, an act of
placing oneself under an obligation’ (ibid., 45). Elsewhere he writes of the ‘tautology that one ought to keep
one’s promises’ (Searle 1969, 185). He also refers to this as an analytic truth (ibid., 179). See section 5 for a
discussion of an alternative view of the meaning of ‘to promise’.
12 Schurz (1997) offers a charitable reconstruction of Searle’s argument. He acknowledges the role acceptance
plays, but he claims nevertheless that the argument does not work because ‘there is no logical way to infer
from the acceptance of OA(x,p) by person x that OA(x,p) is true’ (ibid., 179). He fails to see, however, that
what Searle had in mind was collective acceptance rather than individual acceptance. And, whereas the claim
that (mere) individual acceptance has ontological and normative import in the context of institutions is indeed
implausible, the claim that collective acceptance has ontological and normative significance lies at the heart of
several recent accounts of social ontology (see Gilbert 1989, 1996; 2006; Searle 1995; Tuomela 1995, 2002,
2007).
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Given what he has said about collective acceptance and deontic power in his 1995, it
appears that Searle still holds this view. Eerik Lagerspetz defends this claim with
respect to institutional authority: ‘Acceptance does not, in these cases, imply anything
like moral approval or tacit consent’ (1995, 160; see also Tuomela 2002, 151 and
Gilbert 2006, 269–71).
The difference between acceptance and endorsement is important. It is exemplified in a
particularly salient way in Al Gore’s concession speech that he delivered in December 2000
after the U.S. Supreme Court had decided in favor of George Bush as the next president in spite
of the contested and decisive outcome of the election in Florida. Gore’s words were the
following: ‘Let there be no doubt, while I strongly disagree with the court’s decision, I accept
it.’ The strong disagreement is a normative attitude, the opposite of endorsement. Gore’s
acceptance is a factual attitude that turned out to be part of a collective acceptance (that is not
without exception). Searle holds that such factual attitudes suffice for the functioning of the
relevant institutions, including their deontic dimension. The argument does not need to refer to
endorsement, which would jeopardize the argument against the Is-Ought Thesis.
Thus, whether or not Searle’s argument against that thesis works depends in part on
whether collective acceptance supports or generates obligations. Another claim that one
might wish to question is that the statement that to make a promise entails an obligation to do
as promised holds a priori. In section 4 I shall discuss Gilbert’s (2006) views. She defends
both claims. Together with the status account of constitutive rules, this entails that Searle’s
Is-Ought Argument has in effect only recently received a proper defense, one that is made
explicit in this paper.
4 Collective Acceptance and Obligations
At the heart of the argument concerning promising presented in section 3 lies the idea that
collective acceptance can by itself support or generate obligations. This is the case when
collectively accepting a rule or norm implies being bound by it. Now, why should we believe
this? Searle (1995) maintains that social rights and obligations owe their existence to
collective acceptance. However, what he says about collective acceptance does not reveal
anything about why it might generate obligations. Without further arguments, Searle’s claim
is unconvincing.13 Gilbert (2006), on the other hand, provides an account of collective
acceptance that goes some way towards explaining how it obligates. I present her account in
this section, and discuss her arguments in favor of it in section 5.
The central notion in Gilbert’s account of collective, or in her terms ‘joint’ acceptance is
joint commitment (I shall follow Gilbert’s usage of the term ‘joint acceptance’ from this
point onwards). A collection of individuals can be jointly committed to a propositional
attitude such as belief, or intention. Focusing on beliefs and intentions, they become jointly
committed by each openly expressing his or her willingness to be committed to the belief or
the intention together with the others with whom they hereby come to form a group (Gilbert
1996, 349). As a consequence of doing so, they are obliged to uphold the belief or intention
in group-related contexts (Gilbert 1989; see Tuomela 1995 for similar claims). This process
13 What Searle (1999) says about desire-independent reasons could be taken to imply that he no longer
believes that collective acceptance is the ultimate source of institutional obligations. Searle (1999) proposes
that an intention to do as promised results in a desire-independent reason to do as promised, and that the
person who made the promise has such a reason irrespective of whether at the time the obligation is to be
discharged she desires to do as promised. Note that this flies in the face of the fact that we do not let people off
the hook when they say they never really intended to keep their promise in the first place.
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has three ingredients. First, there has to be willingness to become jointly committed to a
view or an intention. Second, this willingness has to be openly expressed by each of those
involved to the others. Third, expressing such willingness has to occur in conditions of
common knowledge. All these ingredients are factual. In combination with one another,
however, they have normative implications.14
A member of a committee, for instance, cannot publicly express disagreement with a
point of view that has been accepted by the committee, at least not without making it clear
that she is expressing her personal beliefs. Note that the obligations at issue are social or
institutional rather than moral (Searle 1969, 176). Social obligations provide a sufficient
reason for acting accordingly in the sense that to comply is the rational thing to do provided
there are no moral reasons that count against it (Gilbert 2006, 27–35). This means that they
trump preference-based considerations, but can be trumped by moral concerns.
Joint acceptance of a rule amounts to being jointly committed to that rule. This involves
the obligation to uphold the rule. A consequence of upholding a rule is that the rule is
operative. Gilbert makes the point as follows: ‘There is a social rule in a population P if and
only if the members of P jointly accept a requirement of the following form: members of P
are to perform action A in circumstances C.’ (Ibid., 198) When a rule is operative in a certain
community any member incurs the relevant obligation when in the circumstances specified
in the rule. This much is implied by Gilbert’s claim that joint acceptance of a rule ‘amounts
to the imposition of a requirement’ (ibid.). All in all, by being a member of a group that
jointly accepts a rule one not only incurs the obligation to uphold the rule in group-related
contexts but one also becomes subject to that rule, which means that when the relevant
circumstances arise one incurs the obligation specified in the rule.
Gilbert’s claim that a rule exists exactly if it is jointly accepted basically amounts to a
statement of the Collective Acceptance Principle [CAP] formulated above for the case of
social rules. As a consequence, her account of joint acceptance supports what was identified
as the crucial premise of Searle’s Is-Ought Argument. As Searle has no account of why
collective acceptance of a normative power can as such generate an obligation, Gilbert’s
account of joint acceptance nicely complements the reconstruction of Searle’s argument
presented in section 3. (Gilbert does not provide a formulation of the rule involved in
promising, but does state that it is a joint commitment phenomenon; ibid., 223.)
Note that, according to the reconstruction of Searle’s argument, the rule that is jointly
accepted is a constitutive rule. Constitutive rules do not explicitly specify requirements.
However, their acceptance presupposes that one grasps the meaning of the status term involved.
This means that joint acceptance of the claim that Xs are Ys presupposes that those who do the
accepting know what being a Y amounts to. And what being a Y amounts to is specified by the
relevant status rule. Joint acceptance of a constitutive rule, then, implies that the relevant status
rule is operative, and hence that the relevant normative powers are in force.15
In order for Gilbert’s account of joint acceptance really to support Searle’s Is-Ought
Argument it should not involve any implicitly normative factors. In particular, whether or
not a rule is jointly accepted should be a factual matter. In this connection, it is important to
note that joint acceptance does not require endorsement. Often, acquiescence or merely
going along with the rules suffices for incurring the concomitant obligations (ibid., 269–71;
14 Accounts of joint attitudes that have this structure are sometimes criticized for being circular. In response,
one can bite the bullet and accept that a conceptual reduction is not to be had. See Petersson (2007) for a
reductive proposal.
15 Insofar as obligations are concerned, then, there is no difference between jointly accepting a rule of the form
‘If X, then Z’ and jointly accepting a rule of the form ‘If X then Y’ where what it means to be a Y is just for the
normative powers Z to be instantiated.
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see section 3 for others who support a similar claim). Furthermore, the connection between
joint acceptance and obligations should not be a synthetic or a posteriori one. Gilbert’s
account of joint acceptance also meets this requirement. She claims that the existence of an
obligation of joint commitment in joint commitment phenomena such as promising is
knowable a priori (Gilbert 2006, 223).16
Before turning to her arguments as to why we should believe that the obligation involved
in promising is not a moral but a mere social obligation, it is worth noting that Gilbert’s
position on the issues discussed in this section bears a close affinity to that of H.L.A. Hart.
Focusing on legal rules and the obligations involved in them, Hart also defends a distinction
between moral and non-moral obligations. He holds that for a social rule to exist it must be
generally complied with, and it must be used as a standard of criticism of the behavior of the
members of the relevant group. These ideas bear a close affinity to Gilbert’s claim that social
rules bind the behavior of those members, and that their existence warrants rebuking
members who do not follow those rules. Gilbert’s account is in a sense more fundamental
than that of Hart, for instance because she explains why people regard their criticisms of
others as appropriate in terms of joint commitment, whereas Hart leaves this feature
unexplained (see for a discussion of the differences, ibid. 185–203).
The upshot is that, just as Searle, Gilbert believes that the mere instantiation of
intentional attitudes can have normative implications. This means that Gilbert’s views
on joint acceptance can be used in support of the Is-Ought Argument. The advantage of
doing this is that, in contrast to Searle’s views on collective acceptance, Gilbert provides
an account of joint acceptance that goes some way to explaining why it has these
normative implications, and – as I shall discuss in section 5.2 – provides arguments as
to why we should believe it does.
5 Bratman Versus Gilbert
5.1 Bratman and the Value of Assurance
Gilbert’s views have not gone unchallenged. Bratman believes that normative implications
of the kind under consideration require more than just the instantiation of certain intentional
attitudes. In his view, intentional attitudes have normative consequences only in conjunction
with values. He invokes the value of assurance in order to account for the rights and
obligations that he believes are often, though not always, present when there is a shared
intention. In relation to this value of assurance, Bratman (1999, chapter 7) appeals to
Thomas Scanlon’s (1990) Principle of Fidelity, which can be rendered in a somewhat
simplified form as follows:
If A provides B assurance that she will do x, in the absence of special justification, A
must do x unless B consents to x’s not being done.
Bratman argues that this principle applies in many instances of shared intention and action.
In contrast to Gilbert, he holds that any rights or obligations involved in shared or joint
intentions derive from the applicability of this principle, rather than from the intentions only.
16 Gilbert uses the term ‘analytic’ in relation to her argument in support of political obligations. She defends
what she calls ‘an analytic membership argument’ according to which those who jointly accept the political
institutions of a country are obliged to uphold those institutions (Gilbert 2006, 7–10).
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The Principle of Fidelity is a substantive moral principle (i.e. it is a synthetic or a posteriori
statement in which a moral term is used). As a consequence, it cannot feature in the Is-Ought
Argument. Note that, if the Principle of Fidelity is needed to derive promissory obligations,
[CAP], and hence premise [2] of the argument, must be false.
Searle has considered an objection to his Is-Ought Argument that has the same structure.
Rather than the Principle of Fidelity, the principle he considered is this: ‘One ought to keep
all one’s promises.’ His argument against this objection is simply that such a principle is not
needed to derive a genuine promise (Searle 1969, 184). As an argument in favor of [CAP],
this will of course not do. Note, however, that Gilbert’s account of joint acceptance provides
indirect support for Searle’s argument. Now we know more about how joint acceptance is
supposed to issue in obligations, the idea that [CAP] suffices for deriving a normative claim
from merely factual presuppositions will perhaps be somewhat more palatable to those who
baulk at it initially. In section 5.2 I go on to discuss Gilbert’s arguments in favor of the idea
that promissory obligations are due to joint acceptance. Here, however, I want to consider
how the Is-Ought Argument would need to be revised if Bratman is right and a moral
principle such as the Principle Fidelity is needed in order to derive the obligation to do as
promised.
The fact that it is not sufficient need not imply that collective acceptance is irrelevant to
the obligation invoked in the institution of promising. Here is a way in which the idea that
collective acceptance bears on the obligations we have can be preserved. Rather than
claiming that promising involves obligations, the first premise of the alternative argument
could be that promising is by definition a matter of providing some kind of assurance.17 On
this view, promising does not involve a normative status directly.18 As before, the relevant
constitutive rule would specify the way in which a promise is made in the context at issue.
Given that, on this view, promising does not involve a normative status, the idea that the
Collective Acceptance Principle applies to this constitutive rule is harmless. In order to
derive an obligation, one would have to add the Principle of Fidelity as an additional
premise.19 The upshot is that even if Searle’s Is-Ought Argument fails, the logic of
institutional action based on the status schema and the account of constitutive rules survives
with only minor modifications.20
5.2 Gilbert and the Nature of Social Obligations
On Bratman’s view, the obligation involved in a promise is to be explained in terms of the
value of assurance. Shared intentions as such need not come with obligations (Bratman
17 Scanlon (1990) is committed to this view. See Shockley (2008) for a version of this view that does not
require an appeal to the Principle of Fidelity. Shockley defends a social practice account of promising against
Scanlon’s critique.
18 Bach and Harnish (1979) have also argued that promising is not by definition a matter of placing oneself
under an obligation. They maintain that the speech act of promising is not an institutional act and that the
analysis of the generation of the institutional obligation should be separated from that of the speech act.
19 The Principle of Fidelity cannot, of course, be used for all institutional statuses. The obligation involved in
legal tender, for instance, appears to be unrelated to the value of assurance. As Bratman suggested to me in
personal conversation, Rawls’ Principle of Fair Play could play the role that the Principle of Fidelity plays
with respect to promising on Scanlon’s view at least in some such cases.
20 The conclusion of the argument as presented in section 2.2 would then be: Jones has provided Smith
assurance of the fact that he will pay him five dollars. Together with the Principle of Fidelity this implies that
Jones is obliged to do so (supposing the conditions of the Principle are met). Note that this affects the relation
between statuses and normative powers. When a status is instantiated, the normative power that is character-
istic of it will only be instantiated if it is sanctioned by morality.
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1999, 2009). Gilbert argues instead that they do: ‘each party to a shared intention is
obligated to each to act as appropriate to the shared intention in conjunction with the rest’
(2009, 175).21 Bratman’s key argument against Gilbert’s view of the relation between joint
commitment and what he calls ‘mutual obligations’ is that such obligations are not
always present when a shared intention is (Bratman 1999, chapter 7; 2009).22 If this
argument were to transpose to promising, then there could be genuine promises without
concomitant obligations. This possibility is ruled out by Gilbert’s account of joint
acceptance of rules. Gilbert supports this claim with an independent argument. She
maintains that the obligations involved in promising are context-insensitive. This means
that the obligation to do as promised exists even if it turns out that, when we consider the
wider context, the person who made the promise turns out to have another obligation that
conflicts with it. To give an example, we commonly take someone who has made two
promises such that keeping one entails breaking the others to have two conflicting
obligations (Gilbert 2006, 31–32).
In this respect, obligations of joint commitments differ from moral requirements, or
so Gilbert argues. A moral requirement ceases to exist when a more important moral
issue arises. Gilbert (ibid., 159–60) discusses a case in which Jane has a moral
obligation to help a child who hurt its arm. She supposes that just before Jane gets
to the child an elderly woman collapses with an apparent heart attack. It appears that in
this situation Jane is obliged to help the elderly woman and is no longer obliged to help
the child immediately. The new obligation makes the old obligation disappear. (Note
that once she has done what she can for the woman Jane might once again become
obliged to help the child.) Context-insensitivity is one of the marks of social obliga-
tions. It appears that joint acceptance generally involve obligations that are context-
insensitive in Gilbert’s sense.
A second feature of the obligations involved in promising is that they are relational or
directed (ibid., 38–41).23 We owe the actions we promised to perform to particular people.
Those people have a special standing in relation to us for no other reason than that we
have made a promise to them. This involves their having a right to the performance of
the action at issue. Now, whereas one might think that the Principle of Fidelity can
accommodate the bare fact that promises entail obligations to particular people, it
clearly fails to do justice to these concomitant rights (ibid., 227). Scanlon’s Principle
of Fidelity contains an escape clause according to which one does not need to perform
the action if one has special justification for not doing so. An implication of this is that,
if one has an overriding reason not to fulfill the obligation, the special claim that the
promisee had disappears along with the obligation. This does not seem to be correct
(see also Gilbert 2004).
21 Alonso (2009) argues that, in the absence of special circumstances, shared intentions generate obligations.
He argues that the sociopsychological basis for these obligations is ‘partly constitutive’ of shared intention
(ibid., 475). This means that, in contrast to Bratman, Alonso does not regard the presence of these obligations
as a contingent matter. In contrast to Gilbert, however, he maintains that the obligations are moral and depend
on moral principles (see his discussion of Scanlon’s Principle of Due Care and his Principle of Loss Aversion;
ibid., 466–72). This implies that his view is similar to Bratman in the sense that it does not support Searle’s Is-
Ought Argument.
22 Bratman’s other arguments pertain to coerced and immoral shared intentions. Gilbert (2006, 228–34) argues
against this that coerced and immoral promises do involve promissory obligations.
23 The directional nature of promises also plays an important role in Shockley’s (2008) social practice account
of promising. In contrast to the Searlean account presented in this paper, however, Shockley does not
understand social practices or institutions in terms of collective or joint acceptance.
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The joint acceptance account of promissory obligations does not suffer from this prob-
lem. It entails that the promissory obligation remains in place even when other consider-
ations entail that one has an overall obligation to perform another action than the promised
one. Thus, it accommodates the directedness of promissory obligations. As Gilbert (2006,
227n22) points out, Bratman’s account fails to accommodate this feature. Directedness is the
second mark of social obligations. If promissory or other obligations involved in institutions
are indeed social rather than moral obligations, this provides support for the claim that they
are ultimately due to joint commitment. Given the Normative Power Derivation, we can now
see that these arguments support Searle’s thesis that in the context of institutions one can
derive an ought-statement from mere is-statements.
A lot depends on an adequate assessment of these two arguments. Gilbert’s claim
that joint commitment generates obligations is sometimes met with an incredulous stare.
Those who respond in that way owe us criticisms of Gilbert’s arguments concerning the
context-insensitivity and the directedness of the obligations involved in promising as
well as many other institutional phenomena. Such criticisms are also needed in order to
refute the Is-Ought Argument. Some might say that Gilbert’s arguments for denying
that moral obligations can be directed after all are not that convincing. Others might
want to argue that moral obligations can be context-insensitive. The idea would be that
it is possible to have two moral obligations that are in tension with one another and
that one ought to act only on one of them. On this line of argument, Gilbert fails to
appreciate the difference between moral obligations and moral oughts.24 Such criticisms
need to be spelled out in more detail. And even if successful, they still do not establish
that the Is-Ought Argument cannot be made to work on some conception of collective
acceptance.
6 Conclusion
According to the status account, an institution can be analyzed in terms of a constitutive rule
and a status rule. Status rules pertain to the practical dimension of institutional entities, i.e. to
the normative powers they involve. Constitutive rules specify what is required for an
institutional status along with its normative powers to be instantiated. The status schema
has been used to clarify the structure of Searle’s Is-Ought Argument. The resulting recon-
struction of the argument is the Normative Power Derivation. The derivation turned out to be
valid. The second statement of derivation is the pivotal premise of the argument. According
to this premise, collective or joint acceptance suffices for the instantiation of institutional
statuses including their normative powers.
Gilbert has argued in favor of the pivotal premise that such rights and obligations are
intrinsic to certain collective intentional states. Bratman denies this. It follows that Gilbert is
committed to the soundness of the Is-Ought Argument, whereas Bratman will regard it as
unsound. Thus, the controversy about Searle’s argument four decades ago is in effect
mirrored in one of the most pressing problems in the contemporary literature on collective
intentionality. The upshot is that Searle’s Is-Ought Argument deserves to be taken seriously
once again.25
24 I thank an anonymous referee for pressing me on these issues.
25 I gratefully acknowledge helpful comments from Michael Bratman, Davide Grossi, Uskali Mäki, John
Skorupski, and Raimo Tuomela, as well as from two anonymous referees and the audience at Collective
Intentionality IV (Siena, 2004).
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